Courts are Beginning to Define the Limits of Pyett
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, _ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1456 (Apr. 1, 2009), the United States Supreme Court determined that, as a matter of law, a union may, through a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), waive an individual’s right to present statutory claims of employment discrimination to a jury. The concern, however, which the Court recognized, is that since the union has control over which claims go to arbitration and which claims do not, the union could effectively prevent the employee from any kind of trial, whether through arbitration or through court.
The courts are now beginning to define the limits of Pyett. In Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc., No. 06-cv-07858 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009), a court issued one of the first decisions applying Pyett. In Kravar, the employee sought to submit her claims to a jury. She argue that arbitration was possible for her because she had tried to submit her claim to the union, but was told that she “could not do so because the union was most likely to dismiss [her] complaint.” Id. at pg. 5-6. The Court, denying the motion to compel arbitration, held that:
The current record is sparse, but it only supports a single conclusion: The CBA here operated to preclude Ms. Kravar from raising her disability-discrimination claims in any forum. As such, the CBA operated as a waiver over Ms. Kravar’s substantive rights, and may not be enforced.
The Court noted that these facts “falls within an exception to the enforceability of a union-negotiated arbitration agreement expressly noted in Pyett.”
Accordingly, while a waiver of a jury contained in a CBA is enforceable, a jury will remain available if the union, in deciding which cases go to arbitration, prevents the individual from having his or her claims heard.
