U.S. Supreme Court Allows “Me Too” Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases
In Sprint v. Mendelsohn, 466 F. 3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006), the United States Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of what has commonly been referred to as “me too” evidence, meaning evidence that other employees not supervised by the plaintiff’s manager were also victimized by the same type of employment discrimination. In the Sprint case, the plaintiff was terminated as part of a reduction in force. However, the plaintiff believed that her particular termination was not business related, but rather the result of age discrimination. To support her claim, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence from five former Sprint employees who claimed that their managers discriminated against them because of their age. None of the five former employees worked in the same department as the plaintiff and none of them worked under the plaintiff’s supervisor. Sprint argued, among other things, that the evidence was not relevant to whether the plaintiff was discriminated against and the trial court agreed, prohibiting the plaintiff from adducing evidence from employees not similarly situated to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by implementing a per se rule precluding such “me too” evidence. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the plaintiff’s proposed “me too” evidence and found that it was relevant. As a result, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision and ordered a new trial with instructions to admit the challenged testimony.
Sprint appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which, affirming the Tenth Circuit’s decision, stated that “[w]e conclude that such [me too] evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.” Because it was not entirely clear that the trial court was applying a per se rule, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a further explanation of its decision. The Court elaborated that the “question [of] whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual Age Discrimination in Employment Act case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case.”
Now, a fact-based inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis regarding “me too” evidence so that a victim of employment discrimination will not be subjected to an absolute rule excluding such evidence as irrelevant. We at Schwartz & Perry LLP believe that the Sprint case represents a victory for employment discrimination plaintiffs who often find their claims difficult to prove because of the lack of direct evidence of employment discrimination.
