New York Employment Lawyer Blog

In the case of Hubbard v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2008 WL 464694 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008), currently pending in the Southern District of New York, the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that they were subjected to a hostile work environment because they were African-American. The plaintiffs recounted a two-year period where they were given demeaning tasks, while their white co-workers were not, and where their co-workers posted pictures of a blurry black woman and a picture of two monkeys, referring to the plaintiffs.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, in a motion for summary judgment, claiming that not all of the acts could be considered “discrimination,” since they did not reference the plaintiffs’ race. The court denied the defendant’s motion holding that “[w]hile not every allegation bespeaks of overt racial animus,” sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find that the acts were motivated by race discrimination.

The court’s decision in Hubbard reaffirms that merely because particular conduct may not directly reference race, it still may be motivated by race and serve as the basis for a race discrimination claim. Instead, courts will look to “the totality of the circumstances” to determine if conduct is based on race, even where the conduct itself does not implicate race.

An employee may assert a claim for workplace retaliation when he/she is punished for asserting or assisting with a claim of employment discrimination or sexual harassment. One of the elements that must be established in order for such a claim to succeed is that the plaintiff suffer some kind of “adverse employment action” as a result of the complaint. Examples of such adverse employment actions include, but are not limited to, termination, demotion, cut in pay or transfer to less desirable location.

In Fei v. Westl AG, the plaintiff brought suit against his employer, claiming that the company breached his rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The company then filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, claiming that he misappropriated the company’s confidential information.

Judge Baer, of the Southern District of New York, found that the company’s counterclaim against the plaintiff was adverse employment action to support a claim of workplace retaliation. The court found that since the plaintiff alleged that “he has suffered harm to his reputation, intimidation, legal costs and delay as a result of the counter claims,” the counterclaims impacted his ability to secure prospective employment.

The court also relied upon the interesting timing of the counterclaims, noting that if the company was going to file a claim against the employee, why would it wait until shortly after the plaintiff filed his own claim? In short, if a company responds to an employee’s claim under the New York City Human Rights Law with a counterclaim, a company may be exposed to a claim for workplace retaliation.

In the case of John Doe Anti-Terrorism Officer v. The City of New York, 06-CV-13738, A Muslim New York City Police Officer has prevailed in a Motion for Summary Judgment in his race discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. §1981. The officer claims that a counter-terrorism advisor to the New York Police Department (NYPD) created a hostile work environment by subjecting him to discriminatory remarks and constantly forwarding emails degrading Muslims to the plaintiff and other NYPD personnel.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the defendant's argument that his comments and emails were “free speech” that should be protected by the First Amendment because “acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.” The Court’s ruling elucidates that race discrimination in the workplace is not constitutionally protected free speech.

The City of New York has agreed to settle a class-action race discrimination lawsuit against its Parks Department. The case involved a claim that the Parks Department had a pattern and practice of paying minorities significantly less than their white counterparts, and creating an environment which was rife with racially charged derogatory remarks. The plaintiffs also alleged that complaints would go unanswered and retaliation for making a complaint was the norm.

In this case, according to a recent article in The New York Times, the data showed that over 90% of Parks Department employees earning less that $20,000 per year were either African-American or Hispanic, whereas only 14.2% of those earning between $50,000 and $60,000 were either African-American or Hispanic. This disparity is significant in that it demonstrates a pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct over a period of time.

It is important to note that employment discrimination need not be proven with a "smoking gun," but one form of evidence that a plaintiff may use in an employment discrimination case is that of statistical evidence, which is apparent in this case.

In order to start a lawsuit under many Federal laws, including Title VII, a plaintiff must first secure the “right to sue” from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In order to obtain a “right to sue” from the EEOC, a plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC in timely fashion.

Against that backdrop, the U.S. Supreme Court just clarified what constitutes a “charge” with the EEOC in its recent decision in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowekci. In Holowecki, the plaintiff sought to start a claim by filling out an “Intake Questionnaire” with the EEOC, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and subsequently filed a lawsuit. The defendant sought to dismiss the plaintiff's lawsuit, claiming that the plaintiff had not filed a “charge” with the EEOC.

The U.S. Supreme Court, adopting the analysis of the EEOC, held that a person files a “charge” with the EEOC when the filing, taken as a whole, is a “request” for the agency to take action on the individual’s behalf. Rather than considering the form that is filled out, as the defendant argued, the proper inquiry should be whether the request is for the EEOC to do something, such as investigate a claim, as opposed to a simple request for information from the agency.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Holowecki, rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff's submission was insufficient because they did not file a charge form and because the EEOC did not process the Intake Questionnaire as a charge. The Court, however, held that the plaintiff's submission constituted a charge because it was accompanied by a six-page affidavit asking the EEOC to “please force Federal Express to end their age discrimination plan so we can finish our careers absent the unfairness and hostile environment...” This simple plea for help was enough to transform the submission from a simple request for information into a charge that served as the basis for a lawsuit. The Supreme Court looked at substance rather than form alone. The Court specifically noted that the EEOC advocated this exact position, and that it reached this holding based on the EEOC’s interpretation of its rules.

In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed employees the right to sue over losses to their 401(k) plans in certain circumstances. This is a significant issue in the field of employment law as more employees will retire in the coming years in numbers far greater than ever before and, thus, have a strong interest in their pension and retirement plans.

The Supreme Court held that recovery is authorized where the fiduciary breaches are such that, “they impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account.” The case, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Associates, arose over an employee who sued because his employer failed to make the changes he requested over a plan of two years and the mismanagement led to a loss of $150,000.

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to revisit the issue of a whether a union, through a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), can waive an individual member’s right to present an employment discrimination claim to a jury, and to proceed to union-run arbitration, instead. The Court granted leave to hear this argument in 14 Penn Plaza LLV v. Pyett, a case arising out of the Second Circuit, the Federal appeals court in New York.

The history of this issue began in 1974 in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, where the Court held that a union could NOT waive a union member’s right to a jury in a CBA. In 1991, the Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., held that an individual, as opposed to a union, could waive the right to a jury in an employment discrimination case. In 1998, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Services Corp., the Court was once again presented with a CBA-wavier of the right to a jury, but declined to revisit the issue of enforceability.

Following Wright, the lower circuit courts have almost unanimously recognized that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decisions, an individual may waive the right to a jury, but a union may not do so on that individual’s behalf. In fact, the Second Circuit in Pyett was confirming that exact point of law. Many states, however, including New York, have arrived at conflicting results. Through the upcoming decisions of the Court in Pyett, we shall arrive at a definitive decision on the issue of a union-negotiated wavier of the right to a jury in employment discrimination cases.